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HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION©
Stephen M. Feldman*
Sanford Levinson has written on many topics, including the nature of
American constitutionalism,' monuments and culture, and constitutional
stupidities.3 In this essay, though, I focus on only two of his works. The first is an
article written in 1982 entitled Law as Literature.4 The second is the constitutional
law casebook that Levinson has co-authored since 1983 entitled Processes of
Constitutional Decisionmaking: Cases and Materials.5 I choose these two works
for three main reasons: both have influenced constitutional scholarship; the article
and the book interrelate in provocative ways, appearing sometimes
complementary of and sometimes opposed to each other; and the two works have
directly and indirectly influenced my own scholarship in important ways.'
Part I of this essay focuses on Levinson's Law as Literature article, especially
its assertions of relativism and nihilism in constitutional interpretation Part II
turns to Levinson's constitutional law casebook, particularly its emphasis on a
historicist approach to constitutionalism.' Part III explores how these two works
by Levinson have influenced other constitutional scholars. 9  Part IV, the
Conclusion, is more personal, as I explain how Levinson's works have affected my
own scholarship. 0
© 2003 Stephen M. Feldman.
* Jerry W. Housel/Carl P. Arnold Distinguished Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of
Political Science, University of Wyoming.
1. Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (Princeton U. Press 1988).
2. Sanford Levinson, Written in Stone: Public Monuments in Changing Societies (Duke U. Press
1998).
3. Constitutional Stupidities, Constitutional Tragedies (William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Sanford
Levinson eds., N.Y. U. Press 1998).
4. Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 373 (1982).
5. Paul Brest & Sanford Levinson, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Cases and
Materials (2d ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1983).
6. See e.g. Stephen M. Feldman, American Legal Thought from Premodernism to Postmodernism:
An Intellectual Voyage (Oxford U. Press 2000) [hereinafter Feldman, Intellectual Voyage] (using
historical approach to explain American jurisprudence); Stephen M. Feldman, Please Don't Wish Me a
Merry Christmas: A Critical History of the Separation of Church and State (N.Y. U. Press 1997)
[hereinafter Feldman, Please Don't] (using historical approach to explain separation of church and
state).
7. See text accompanying infra notes 12-23.
8. See text accompanying infra notes 24-53.
9. See text accompanying infra notes 54-76.
10. See text accompanying infra notes 77-86.
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1. INTERPRETATION: THE ARTICLE
Levinson began the article, Law as Literature, by stating the theme captured
in the title: law should be understood as a type of literature. To illuminate this
conception of law, he explained how it was implicit even in the late-nineteenth
century legal science of the Langdellians:
For Langdell law was essentially a literary enterprise, a science of extracting
meaning from words that would enable one to believe in law as a process of
submission to the commands of authoritative texts (the rule of law) rather than as
the creation of willful interpreters (with submission concomitantly producing the
rule of men).
n
This reliance on the understanding of authoritative written texts, Levinson
continued, is paramount in the constitutional rhetoric and politics of the United
States. Citizens, in theory, owe fidelity to the Constitution as an authoritative text
that stands above even democratic or majoritarian processes.12
Yet when Levinson was writing, in 1982, literary criticism was riven with
disputes about the methods for and the possibility of understanding texts. "[T]he
emphasis of much contemporary [literary] theory," Levinson wrote, "is an attack
on the stability of meaning (or, concomitantly, on the possibility of establishing
techniques by which to retrieve meaning) at any given moment."1 3 Many literary
critics had become metaphysical anti-realists, no longer believing that they could
"ground description or analysis in a purported reality beyond the descriptions or
analyses themselves."14  As such, they viewed "the project of ultimate truth-
seeking [as] based on philosophical error [because] it presumes a privileged
foundation for measuring the attainment of truth, and it is precisely this
foundation that Nietzsche and most of the more radical literary theorists deny.
15
Since law was a type of literature, Levinson reasoned further, the
contemporary approaches to literary criticism could be imported into the
jurisprudential realm.1 6 Predictably, then, a decreasing number of constitutional
scholars still believed that the Constitution had a stable or objective meaning,
based on either the plain meaning of the text or the original intentions of the
framers. 7 Indeed, "[i]f one takes seriously the views articulated by Nietzsche,
Rorty, and Fish (among others)"-and Levinson was clearly one who took such
views seriously-"one must give up the search for principles and methods of
11. Levinson, supra n. 4, at 374. For a discussion of Langdellian legal science, see Feldman,
Intellectual Voyage, supra n. 6, at 91-105.
12. Levinson contrasts the American and English conceptions of a constitution. "Anyone familiar
with English political discourse [knows that] debate in England centers on the right or wrong of a
particular bill, not on its fidelity to a presumptively authoritative text that stands above parliamentary
activity." Levinson, supra n. 4, at 375.
13. Id. at 377.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 383-84.
16. Id. at 384. Levinson wrote: "If we consider law as literature, then we might better understand
the malaise that afflicts all contemporary legal analysis, nowhere more severely than in constitutional
theory." Id. at 377.
17. Levinson, supra n. 4, at 378-79.
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constitutional interpretation.", 8  "For a Nietzschean reader of constitutions,"
Levinson elaborated, "there is no point in searching for a code that will produce
'truthful' or 'correct' interpretations; instead, the interpreter, in Rorty's words,
'simply beats the text into a shape which will serve his own purpose."' 19
Levinson did not find his own argument felicitous, yet he could see no
acceptable alternative. "To put it mildly," he wrote, "there is something
disconcerting about accepting the Nietzschean interpreter into the house of
constitutional analysts, but I increasingly find it impossible to imagine any other
way of making sense of our own constitutional universe., 20 We were doomed to
an interpretive relativism, confronting multiple constitutional readings without
any means of identifying the correct one. Thus, "[t]here are as many plausible
readings of the United States Constitution as there are versions of Hamlet.",21 In
fact, even worse, Levinson admitted that he saw no way to "combat" against
"nihilism., 22
II. HISTORY: THE CASEBOOK
In 1975, Paul Brest authored a new casebook in constitutional law entitled
Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Cases and Materials.3
Unsurprisingly, Brest's construction of the book seemed to be influenced by the
legal process school of thought. He had received his law degree from Harvard in
1965,24 when legal process thinking still dominated jurisprudence. Not
coincidentally, then, in the Acknowledgments section of his new casebook, Brest
specially noted that "[t]he last several chapters of this book are filled with
references to... Hart & Wechsler's pathbreaking The Federal Courts and the
Federal System .... ,,z. That federal courts casebook,26 which Henry M. Hart and
18. Id. at 385.
19. Id. (quoting Richard Rorty, Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century Textualism, in
Consequences of Pragmatism (Essays: 1972-1980) 151 (U. Minn. Press 1982)). Levinson characterized
John Marshall as "perhaps, the great Nietzschean judge of our tradition." Id. at 389.
20. Id. at 385. He added: "To view [the Constitution] as a genuine source of guidance is naive,
however heartbreaking this realization might be." Id. at 378.
21. Id. at 391.
22. Levinson, supra n. 4, at 392. Levinson concluded, pessimistically: "That we cannot walk out of
offending productions of our national epic poem, the Constitution, may often be anguishing, but that
may be our true constitutional fate." Id. at 391-92. His final paragraph ended as follows:
And, just as constellations are human attempts to link the separate stars, so are doctrinal
analyses likely to serve as similar attempts to demonstrate that the cases themselves are
meaningfully linked and intellectually patterned. All such writing (and reading) is a
supreme act of faith. We can hope that some future conjunction of author and reader will
provide a common language of constitutional discourse fit for "'a nation of supple and
athletic minds,"' but for now we can only await its coming and make do with the fractured
and fragmented discourse available to us.
Id. at 402-03 (quoting Walt Whitman, Democratic Vistas, in Walt Whitman: Complete Poetry and
Collected Prose 993 (Library of Am. 1982) (citations omitted)).
23. Paul Brest, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Cases and Materials (Little, Brown &
Co. 1975).
24. The AALS Directory of Law Teachers 2001-2002, at 318 (West 2001) [hereinafter AALS
Directory].
25. Brest, supra n. 23, at vii-viii.
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Herbert Wechsler first published in 1953, was one of the foundational pillars for
the legal process approach.
What was (and is) legal process? 7 Legal process scholars were primarily
concerned with two interrelated concepts: governmental institutions and
governmental processes. In the early 1950s, Hart and Albert Sacks explicated
these concepts in their well-known though long-unpublished course materials, The
28Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law:z8 "The
principle of institutional settlement expresses the judgment that decisions which
are the duly arrived at result of duly established procedures.., ought to be
accepted as binding upon the whole society unless and until they are duly
changed.,29 Legal process scholars thus focused, in part, on distinctions among
governmental institutions: the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, as well
as the state and federal governments. This concern was stated nowhere more
clearly than in the Preface to the first edition of Hart and Wechsler's casebook:
"In varying contexts we pose the issue of what courts are good for-and are not
good for-seeking thus to open up the whole range of questions as to the
appropriate relationship between the federal courts and other organs of federal
and state government."30
Furthermore, according to the legal process scholars, the appropriate lens for
understanding governmental institutions was, of course, process. Scholars such as
Hart, Sacks, and Wechsler sought to specify the processes or procedures that
defined and legitimated the various governmental institutions. For instance,
according to Hart and Sacks, a court's decision was legitimate if the judge or
judges followed the appropriate processes or procedures for judicial
decisionmaking, called "reasoned elaboration.' 1 Reasoned elaboration required
a judge to give reasons for a decision, to articulate those reasons in a detailed and
coherent manner, and to relate the decision to a relevant rule of law applied in a
manner logically consistent with precedent.
32
Paul Brest's casebook on constitutional law, as evidenced by its title,
Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking, unquestionably fell into this legal
process tradition. Previous constitutional law casebooks traditionally had been
organized around substantive principles and doctrines of constitutional law.
Chapters thus would typically focus on topics such as Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause, substantive due process, and freedom of expression.33 Brest
26. Henry M. Hart, Jr., & Herbert Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System (N.Y.
Found. Press 1953).
27. For a more extended discussion of the legal process school of thought, see Feldman, Intellectual
Voyage, supra n. 6, at 115-23.
28. Henry M. Hart, Jr., & Albert Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and
Application of Law 4 (tentative ed., Cambridge 1958).
29. Id.
30. Hart & Wechsler, supra n. 26, at xii.
31. Hart & Sacks, supra n. 28, at 164-67.
32. Id.
33. For an example of this traditional approach, see Gerald Gunther & Noel T. Dowling, Cases and
Materials on Constitutional Law (8th ed., Found. Press 1970).
[Vol. 38:595
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abandoned this orthodox approach for a process-based orientation, as he
explained in the Introduction to the casebook:
Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking was born of personal frustration in
teaching constitutional law from existing casebooks. After several introductory
chapters on judicial review, all of the books proceeded to examine bodies of
substantive doctrine, subject by subject. Questions of how courts arrived at their
decisions continually arose, but answers remained continually elusive. The same
was true of questions concerning the different modes of judicial review and the
proper decisionmaking roles of legislatures and other nonjudicial institutions....
This book is premised on the belief that an explicit focus on the processes of
constitutional decisionmaking offers an understanding of the structure, operation,
and doctrines of the American constitutional system that the conventional
organization cannot provide.
34
Brest consequently divided the book into two parts. The second part, called
Processes of Constitutional Adjudication and the Allocation of Decisionmaking
Authority, was patently focused on classic legal process issues such as the criteria
for judicial decisionmaking (elaborating the process of adjudication) and
congressional power to interpret the Constitution (elaborating the institutional
powers of Congress).35 As Brest specified, "[q]uestions of institutional authority
and of procedure become paramount in Part 2.",36 The first part of the book,
meanwhile, was called The Sources for Constitutional Decisionmaking. "Its
central inquiry," Brest explained, "is how any decisionmaker-a legislator, an
official, or a judge-who is charged with applying the Constitution can determine
what it permits or requires."37 Part One, that is, focused on the processes or
"techniques" of constitutional interpretation,38 "the starting point for most
exercises in constitutional decisionmaking."39 Overall, then, Brest's casebook was
concerned with the "criteria intrinsic to the processes of constitutional
decisionmaking" 4 because it was precisely those criteria that made "a difference
in the outcome of decisions.",
41
The second edition of the casebook was published in 1983. Significantly,
Brest had added his former star student, Sanford Levinson, as a co-author.42
Whereas many casebooks barely change as they move from one edition to the
next, Brest and Levinson radically transformed Processes of Constitutional
Decisionmaking, and the primary agent of change was the new author, Levinson.43
34. Brest, supra n. 23, at 1 (emphasis in original).
35. Id. at 955-1335.
36. Id. at 2.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Brest, supra n. 23, at 1.
40. Id. at 3.
41. Id. at 5 (quoting Richard A. Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision: Toward a Theory of Legal
Justification 30 (Stanford U. Press 1961)).
42. Levinson graduated from Stanford Law School in 1973. AALS Directory, supra n. 24, at 705.
43. In a telephone message, Levinson stated that while the new edition was a "joint undertaking," it
was "undoubtedly true" that he was predominantly responsible for the "turn to history." Telephone
2003]
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To be sure, the co-authors retained not only the legal process-oriented title but
also, and more important, a general concern for issues of institutional authority
and processes of constitutional decision, which had distinguished the first edition.
Yet, just as surely, the second edition moved away from a narrow legal process
focus to a more historicist approach to constitutional law.
Brest and Levinson expressly discussed the transition to a historicist
approach in the Preface to the Second Edition. First of all, they openly
acknowledged their growing ambivalence toward legal process:
The first edition of Processes explicitly adopted the ideology of the legal process
tradition. Its hypothesis was that there existed decisionmaking procedures that
could yield correct or legitimate decisions. Although the validity of this hypothesis
remains a central concern of the book-for it is a crucial matter, about which every
student must come to his or her own judgment-the second edition manifests our
skepticism about the legimating power of process and about the meaning of
"legitimacy."
44
Moreover, they reorganized the book into four parts, with the all-important
Part One, nearly one-third of the book, expressly "organized in historical
fashion."45 Indeed, according to Brest and Levinson, Chapter One "introduces
many of the recurring procedural themes of the course within a chronological
structure that is new in this edition., 46 The point of this new historicist approach
was to place constitutional disputes and decisionmaking within the concrete and
specific contexts in which they had arisen. "The materials thus introduce," the
authors explained, "the concept of constitutional government, the allocation of
decisionmaking authority between the judiciary and nonjudicial institutions, and
some basic problems of constitutional interpretation, while placing the
constitutional controversy in a broader social and political context.,
47
Part One therefore examined "recurring constitutional issues" within four
historical periods: the founding period, the Marshall and Taney Courts period, the
post-Civil War to 1937 period, and the 1937 to World War II period.4
Without sacrificing doctrinal continuity, this organization illuminates relationships
among seemingly discrete bodies of legal doctrine, and between the constitutional
system and the society in which it operates. It takes doctrine seriously on its own
terms and as a manifestation of both social forces and the legal consciousness of a
period, while illustrating both the contingency and continuity of legal doctrine.49
Message from Sanford Levinson to Stephen M. Feldman (Sept. 25, 2002). Levinson noted, though,
that Brest had already demonstrated his interest in a historical approach to constitutional law in a
recently published article. Id.; see Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,
60 B.U. L. Rev. 204, 218-22 (1980) (criticizing originalist approaches to interpreting the Constitution).
44. Brest & Levinson, supra n. 5, at xxxiii (footnote omitted).
45. Id. at xxxi. Part One was 393 pages out of a total of 1377 pages.
46. Id. (emphasis added).
47. Id.
48. Id. at xxxi-xxxii.
49. Brest & Levinson, supra n. 5, at xxxii.
[Vol. 38:595
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Because of this historical and contextual approach to constitutional law,
Brest and Levinson emphasized issues in their book that other casebook authors
either slighted or ignored completely. 50 The most notable example of this
difference was in their treatment of the law of slavery. Besides the notorious Dred
Scott v. Sandford," which found its way into many casebooks, Brest and Levinson
included cases such as The Antelope,52 Prigg v. Pennsylvania,53 and Groves v.
Slaughter.54
III. THE INFLUENCE OF LEVINSON'S WRITING
While Brest and Levinson admitted their growing disenchantment with legal
process, they did not openly acknowledge that their historicist approach was in
tension with the basic tenets of legal process. As Brest had explained in the first
edition, legal process assumed that constitutional decisions were legitimate if the
Justices (or judges) had followed the accepted processes or criteria of
constitutional adjudication.55 But a historicist approach suggested that the very
existence of legitimacy was often a matter of perspective and therefore
questionable. To the extent that constitutional decisions were deemed legitimate,
it was more a function of contingent historical circumstances than a matter of the
application of some abstract criteria or principles.
In fact, by questioning and undermining the legal process approach, Brest
and Levinson fit into a broad intellectual trend of the 1980s, as many legal scholars
repudiated or at least began to doubt the validity of legal process.56 This broad
trend was epitomized in Levinson's own article on constitutional interpretation,
Law as Literature. After all, in that article, Levinson had maintained that
constitutional interpretation could not be objectively grounded on text or framers'
intentions.57 Constitutional adjudication was relativistic and nihilistic, rather than
principled and legitimate.58 From this perspective, then, Levinson's article was
consistent with his casebook.
50. Levinson emphasizes this difference between Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking and
other casebooks in an article. Sanford Levinson, Slavery in the Canon of Constitutional Law, 68
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1087,1089-90 (1993).
51. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
52. 23 U.S. 66 (1825).
53. 41 U.S. 536 (1842).
54. 40 U.S. 449 (1841).
55. Brest, supra n. 23, at 3-5.
56. Feldman, Intellectual Voyage, supra n. 6, at 123-62.
57. Levinson, supra n. 4, at 379. Levinson stated,
[T]he plain meaning approach inevitably breaks down in the face of the reality of
disagreement among equally competent speakers of the native language. Intentionality
arguments... face not only the problem of explaining why intentions of long-dead people
from a different social world should influence us, but also.., the problem of extracting
intentions from the collectivity of individuals and institutions necessary to give legal validity
to the Constitution.
Id.
58. Id. at pt. III.
2003]
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Moreover, if the success of a law review article is measured by the number of
times that it is cited in subsequent articles by other authors, 9 then Levinson's Law
as Literature article was extraordinarily successful. A Westlaw search in the
Journals and Law Reviews ("JLR") database uncovered 220 citations to this
article.60  Many of those citations were for the proposition that constitutional
interpretation was either relativistic, nihilistic, or both. Levinson's article, it would
be fair to say, became the standard citation for this extreme critical postulate.
For example, even before Levinson's article had made it into print, Owen
Fiss cited it as representative of "a new nihilism, one that doubts the legitimacy of
adjudication., 6' Fiss denounced this nihilism as "unwarranted and unsound, but
[as nonetheless] gaining respectability and claiming an increasing number of
important and respected legal scholars, particularly in constitutional law. They
have turned their backs on adjudication and have begun a romance with
politics. ' '62 Another writer criticized those commentators, citing Levinson, 63 who
emphasize "the internally contradictory or radically subjective nature of norms." 64
Yet another writer condemned those who claim that "[i]f we are not objectivists or
foundationalists... chaos will be loosed upon the law. Nietzschean nihilism (or
skepticism, or indeterminacy, or quietism) will reign., 65 The citation? Levinson. 66
Yet again, another writer declared: "Many share the view of Sanford Levinson of
the University of Texas School of Law: '... .[t]here are as many plausible readings
of the United States Constitution as there are versions of Hamlet.',
67
Thus, Levinson's Law as Literature article, along with his casebook, helped
to undermine the legal process perspective on constitutional adjudication. Even
further, his casebook also stood at the forefront of an intellectual movement
toward an alternative conception of constitutional scholarship. That is, Levinson
59. For one serious and one satirical look at the process of winning citations, see Ian Ayres &
Fredrick E. Vars, Determinants of Citations to Articles in Elite Law Reviews, 29 J. Leg. Stud. 427 (2000)
(serious); J. M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, How to Win Cites and Influence People, 71 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 843 (1996) (satirical).
60. The search query was as follows: levinson /2 law /2 literature. This search, conducted on
September 26, 2002, uncovered citations not only to the original publication of the article in the Texas
Law Review, Levinson, supra n. 4, but also to its reprint, Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, in
Interpreting Law and Literature: A Hermeneutic Reader 155 (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds.,
Northwestern U. Press 1988).
61. Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 739, 740 (1982).
62. Id. Interestingly, Fiss cited one other scholar besides Levinson as representative of this nihilist
outlook. It was Paul Brest. Id. at 740 n. 3 (citing Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The
Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 Yale L.J. 1063 (1981)).
63. Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 827,827 n. 5 (1991).
64. Id. at 827.
65. Mark Kingwell, Let's Ask Again: Is Law Like Literature?, 6 Yale J.L. & Humanities 317, 319
(1994).
66. Id. at 319 n. 2.
67. Jeff Broadwater, Taking Its Toll: Partisan Judging and Judicial Review, 4 J. App. Prac. &
Process 41, 41 (2002) (quoting Levinson, supra n. 4, at 391). For some additional similar citations to
Levinson's piece, see Arthur Austin, The Top Ten Politically Correct Law Review Articles, 27 Fla. St.
U. L. Rev. 233, 250 n. 130 (1999); Benjamin Means, Culture and the Law: Monuments to the Past in a
Leveling Wind, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1617, 1620 n. 9 (1999); Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest
Proposal for Improving American Justice, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 215,226 n. 56 (1999).
[Vol. 38:595
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did not merely help break apart the legal process edifice, he also helped build-or
provided an impetus for-a new scholarly approach: historicism. While the
influence of the Brest and Levinson casebook on the way professors teach
18constitutional law is unclear, the book was a harbinger of change in the way
many professors write about constitutional law.6 9 An increasing number of legal
scholars, including Michael J. Klarman, Stephen M. Griffin, and Barry Friedman,
seek to understand American constitutionalism from a historical perspective,
particularly one that accounts for all of American history, not just the framing.70
Griffin elaborates:
[A]ll the theories of constitutional interpretation normally discussed by scholars
accept an ahistorical view about the role that the constitutional principles of the
early republic can and should play in the complex democracy of the present. The
emphasis in these theories-characteristic of American constitutionalism from the
beginning-is on how the fundamental principles adopted by the Founding
generation can solve contemporary constitutional problems. This approach is
completely implausible from an historicist perspective.
68. In an e-mail message, Levinson wrote: "I think that the adoption rate has held fairly steady at
about 30-35 adoptions, but I'm really not at all sure." E-mail from Sanford Levinson to Stephen M.
Feldman, Casebook Adoptions (Sept. 30, 2002). Yet, a new co-author on the fourth edition of the
casebook, Akhil Amar, reported otherwise: "I don't have any hard numbers in hand; but I can report
based on conversations with George Serafin at Aspen that the book has indeed gained considerable
ground with the 4th edition-roughly doubling our share and placing us third overall, according to
rough estimates." E-mail from Akhil Amar to Stephen M. Feldman, Casebook Adoptions (Sept. 30,
2002). Unfortunately, Aspen Publishers, the current publisher of the book, refused to provide any
information regarding the number of adoptions.
69. I certainly do not mean to suggest that the Brest and Levinson casebook was the only or even
the primary cause of this transition in constitutional scholarship. For instance, another book that may
have provoked many constitutional scholars to take a historicist turn was Foucault's Discipline and
Punish. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Alan Sheridan trans.,
Pantheon Books 1977). For a more extensive discussion of the changes in legal scholarship and the
causes of those changes, see Feldman, Intellectual Voyage, supra n. 6, at 137-87. For a discussion of the
turn to history in constitutional scholarship, see G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in
Constitutional Scholarship, 88 Va. L. Rev. 485 (2002).
70. See Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutional Theory Transformed, 108 Yale L.J. 2115 (1999); Barry
Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 5-7 (1998); Michael J.
Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1, 1-7 (1996).
Friedman and Smith write: "[H]istory is essential to interpretation of the Constitution, but the relevant
history is not just that of the Founding, it is that of all American constitutional history." Friedman &
Smith, supra, at 6-7.
This historical approach to constitutional law resonates with the historical new institutionalism
that is blossoming in political science. New institutionalists, in general, explain how Supreme Court
Justices are influenced by both their political preferences and the structural or institutional
mechanisms in which they operate (as Justices). For a helpful explanation of the new institutionalism,
see Keith E. Whittington, Once More unto the Breach: Postbehavioralist Approaches to Judicial
Politics, 25 L. & Social Inquiry 601 (2000) (reviewing Supreme Court Decision-Making: New
Institutionalist Approaches (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., U. Chi. Press 1999); The
Supreme Court in American Politics: New Institutionalist Interpretations (Howard Gillman & Cornell
Clayton eds., U. Press Kan. 1999)). Rogers M. Smith is an example of a historical new institutionalist.
Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History 509-10 (Yale U. Press
1997).
71. Griffin, supra n. 70, at 2120. Elsewhere, Griffin explains that "[c]onstitutionalism should be
appreciated as a dynamic political and historical process rather than as a static body of thought laid
down in the eighteenth century." Stephen M. Griffin, American Constitutionalism: From Theory to
Politics 5 (Princeton U. Press 1996).
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Griffin's statement underscores how a historicist approach manifests a
seismic shift in constitutional scholarship. Legal process scholars typically
assumed that judges were to decide constitutional issues by applying principles-
some legal process theorists wrote of "neutral principles" 72-enduring values that
could be traced to the actions of the constitutional framers.73 But as Griffin
explains, a historicist approach undermines this conventional outlook.
Unsurprisingly, then, Levinson himself has tried to push his historicist insight
beyond where it first appeared in the second edition of Processes of Constitutional
Decisionmaking. His extensive and more recent work on the canon in
constitutional law is directed toward shifting the focus of constitutional law
teaching from Supreme Court cases and current doctrine to a broader focus on the
historical circumstances and contingencies of constitutional rhetoric and
decisionmaking. 74 For instance, he has argued vigorously that the law of slavery
should be extensively covered in introductory constitutional law courses, not only
through discussions of nineteenth-century Supreme Court cases but also through
speeches made by politicians and abolitionists.75
Finally, while Levinson's casebook and his Law as Literature article were
consistent insofar as they both questioned and undermined the legal process
approach to constitutional law, the two works were also, in a different way, in
tension with each other. In particular, a historicist approach to constitutional law
provides a possible response to the purported problems of constitutional
interpretation raised in Levinson's Law as Literature. In that essay, Levinson
seemed to say that constitutional interpretation was relativistic and nihilistic.
76
The Supreme Court Justices were unconstrained and therefore decided cases as an
imposition of will, an exercise in power. But a historicist viewpoint might suggest
otherwise. Constitutional interpretation is never unconstrained. Historical
circumstances or contingencies-or interpretive traditions-always constrain the
Justices when they adjudicate constitutional issues.77 Constitutional interpretation
might appear unconstrained if we contemplate it in some abstract never-land, but
Peter Pan does not sit on the Supreme Court. In the real world, the Justices are
necessarily situated within the traditions of the American constitutional
72. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 15-16
(1959).
73. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 58
(2d ed., Yale U. Press 1986) (first edition in 1962).
74. Legal Canons (J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson eds., N.Y. U. Press 2000); J.M. Balkin &
Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 963 (1998).
75. Levinson, supra n. 50, at pt. III.
76. See Levinson, supra n. 4, at pt. III.
77. I discuss this approach to constitutional interpretation in a number of articles. Stephen M.
Feldman, An Arrow to the Heart: The Love and Death of Postmodern Legal Scholarship, 54 Vand. L.
Rev. 2351, 2370 (2001); Stephen M. Feldman, Made for Each Other: The Interdependence of
Deconstruction and Philosophical Hermeneutics, 26 Phil. & Soc. Criticism 51 (2000); Stephen M.
Feldman, The Politics of Postmodern Jurisprudence, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 166, 174-75 (1996); Stephen M.
Feldman, The Persistence of Power and the Struggle for Dialogic Standards in Postmodern
Constitutional Jurisprudence: Michelman, Habermas, and Civic Republicanism, 81 Geo. L.J. 2243, 2245-
46 (1993) [hereinafter, Feldman, Persistence of Power].
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community.7 8  To be sure, these constraints are not objective-firm and
unmoving-but they are constraints all the same.
Notice, too, that this recognition of the forcefulness of history or tradition
does not relegate us to some type of Burkean conservatism. To say that we are
necessarily embedded in and thus constrained by our communal traditions does
not require us to celebrate our traditions. We can remain critical, or at least try to
be SO. 7 9 Regardless, though, we never can completely escape our own histories,
our own communal traditions. Partly for this reason, Levinson himself
subsequently co-authored an article, with Jack Balkin, that returned to the
question of interpretation. 8° Levinson and Balkin acknowledged that many
readers had read Levinson's Law as Literature piece "as asserting the infinite
malleability of the Constitution. '" 81 In this later article, though, Levinson and
Balkin suggested that while Levinson's earlier piece was not truly misunderstood,
Levinson had at least modified his position. In legal interpretation, they
explained, "not anything goes.,
82
IV. CONCLUSION
For a conclusion, instead of merely reiterating what I have already explored,
I shall discuss how Levinson's work, particularly Law as Literature and Processes
of Constitutional Decisionmaking, have influenced my own scholarship. Without
doubt, this is somewhat narcissistic, but so what? Many legal scholars have taken
83a narcissistic turn, at least once in a while. More important, I believe that by
relating Levinson's writing to my own, I can cast his work in an unusual and
provocative light. Why? Because the relationship between our works is ironic,
perhaps even perverse, in the following sense. Over the years, I have relied
extensively and expressly on one of Levinson's works, while I have never overtly
used or relied upon the other. Yet, the one that I have explicitly relied upon, I
have sought to repudiate. The other, which I have never expressly used, has had
enormous positive albeit indirect influence on my work.
The piece that I have extensively and expressly focused upon is Law as
Literature. Much of my writing has aimed in part toward refuting Levinson's
relativistic and nihilistic position without accepting the conservatism of writers like
78. Philip Bobbitt argues that constitutional adjudication is legitimate if the Justices follow one or
more of six accepted "modalities of constitutional argument." Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional
Interpretation 12-13 (Blackwell 1991).
79. See Stephen M. Feldman, How to Be Critical, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 893 (2000) (explaining how
to be critical).
80. Sanford Levinson & J. M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1597, 1603 n. 25 (1991).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1614 n. 64 (emphasis added). Balkin and Levinson suggested that they had modified their
positions when they wrote: "we also may have too easily accepted that the paradigm of interpretive
debate was a solitary scholar lecturing on Keats' Ode to a Nightingale from a lectern. Yet it has
become increasingly clear that many acts of interpretation are performative utterances which
simultaneously constitute acts of power." Id. at 1613.
83. See Feldman, Intellectual Voyage, supra n. 6, at 176 (discussing the self-reflective quality of
much postmodern legal scholarship).
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Raoul Berger and Robert Bork.84 In one article, I explained Levinson as follows:
many constitutional theorists accept an "either/or-either we can ground
knowledge on an objective foundation, or we have only relativistic subjectivity.
Some of these theorists, though, "then conclude that objectivity is indeed
impossible since.., meaning depends on our prejudices. Consequently, according
to these theorists, the interpreter imposes meaning on a text through the exercise
of will and raw political power." 86 Who were these deconstructive theorists? My
primary citation was Sanford Levinson. In fact, as was true for other writers,
Levinson became my standard cite for a scholar who maintained that
constitutional interpretation was relativistic and nihilistic, or as I pejoratively
phrased it in one article, he was someone who had "surrendered to relativism (or
nihilism). '
Thus, my repeated citations to Law as Literature were not in approbation.
To the contrary, I presented Levinson's position as one extreme that I sought to
avoid. Like Levinson, I was concerned with the either/or-either we can ground
knowledge on an objective foundation, or we have only relativistic subjectivity.
And like Levinson again, I rejected the possibility of grounding knowledge on
some objective foundation, especially in constitutional adjudication. Conservative
theorists such as Berger and Bork maintained that we can directly access the plain
meaning of the constitutional text or the framers' intentions.88 To me, this claimed
objectivity seemed spurious, and patently so. But whereas Levinson therefore
viewed himself as doomed to relativistic subjectivity, I set forth to explain a third
way: the either/or was a false dichotomy. Objectivity, to be sure, was impossible,
but that reality did not send us into a relativistic nosedive toward nihilism-or at
least that was what I set out to demonstrate.89
While I have dwelled upon (the refutation of) Levinson's Law as Literature
position, I have never expressly relied upon his constitutional law casebook. I
have been teaching constitutional law for more than fifteen years and have always
used a competing book. 9° Yet, I consider myself to be fully immersed in the
historicist turn of constitutional scholarship. For close to a decade, most of my
writing, as opposed to my teaching, has viewed both constitutional and
84. See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (Free Press
1990); Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment
(Harv. U. Press 1977). Another objectivist was Ed Meese. Edwin Meese III, Address before the D.C.
Chapter of the Federalist Society Lawyers Division, in Interpreting Law and Literature: A Hermeneutic
Reader, supra n. 60, at 25.
85. Stephen M. Feldman, Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 679, 714 n. 198.
86. Id.
87. Feldman, Persistence of Power, supra n. 77, at 2252, 2252 n. 47. For another example, see
Stephen M. Feldman, The New Metaphysics: The Interpretive Turn in Jurisprudence, 76 Iowa L. Rev.
661,691-92, 691 nn. 218-19 (1991).
88. Berger, supra n. 84, at 45, 363-72.
89. I take some comfort in recognizing that Levinson himself has modified his position so that he no
longer believes that judges are unconstrained when they interpret the Constitution. Levinson &
Balkin, supra n. 80, at 1614, 1614 n. 64.
90. Geoffrey R. Stone, Louis M. Seidman, Cass R. Sunstein & Mark V. Tushnet, Constitutional Law
(4th ed., Aspen L. & Bus. 2001).
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jurisprudential problems through a historical prism.9' Legal scholarship that
focuses solely on Supreme Court doctrine (or doctrine from other courts) seems,
to me, to be missing a crucial aspect of the picture, if we wish to see American
constitutionalism at all clearly. Constitutional developments need to be explained
within their respective social, cultural, and political contexts. In short, I now see
the constitutional world very much as Levinson has long been urging in his
casebook. His contribution to the general intellectual turn toward historicism has
undoubtedly helped to push me toward that viewpoint.
One final question needs to be addressed, and I suspect that if Professor
Levinson has read this essay to this point, he is thinking about the same question.
Several times, I have participated in discussion groups with Levinson and have
heard him speak at conferences. An incredibly high percentage of those times, he
has pushed the conversation around to the teaching of constitutional law. At
which point, he has unabashedly pitched his casebook to the discussion group or
the conferees. He has done the same in writing as well. 92  "'There is an
alternative,"' he has declared. "'You do not have to teach from a traditional
doctrinal book.'" And, without doubt, he always has made a lot of sense: if
constitutional law is as much history as it is doctrine, then why not teach from a
book that emphasizes history?
But I have resisted the change. Of course, I have my reasons. Law students
want doctrine, not history. The bar exam tests doctrine, not history. My class
notes were originally centered on doctrine, not history, though I have worked in
more and more history over the years. The Levinson casebook does not cover the
First Amendment religion clauses, but I think those materials are important and
interesting. Despite these reasons, however, Levinson is right, at least to a degree.
In an ideal world, constitutional law, even in law schools, should be taught more
from a historical perspective. In fact, I would not be surprised if Sandy one day
grabs me and says, "'There is an alternative. Why not switch?'
91. Feldman, Intellectual Voyage, supra n. 6; Feldman, Please Don't, supra n. 6; Stephen M.
Feldman, From Premodern to Modern American Jurisprudence: The Onset of Positivism, 50 Vand. L.
Rev. 1387 (1997); Feldman, supra n. 85.
92. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 963, 967
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